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SYSTEMIC CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: 
MICRO-TO-MACRO TRANSITIONS, 
COLLECTIVE OUTCOMES AND SELF-REGULATION 
 
ABSTRACT 
We call attention to the need to revitalize the systemic nature of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) and offer some suggestions about how this might be accomplished.  We 
introduce the concept of systemic CSR and associate it with micro-to-macro transitions, the need 
to make systemic objectives explicit, and the responsibility of system participants to regulate 
their behavior in order to contribute to these outcomes.  We comment, from a systemic 
perspective, on four different management approaches to CSR—shareholder value, corporate 
social performance, stakeholder theory and corporate citizenship.  Three general systemic 
principles that participants can use as decision-making guides are a focus on value creation, 
ongoing assessment of collective outcomes, and reflective engagement in the aggregation 
process.  We conclude by commenting briefly on suggestions for future research. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is an inherently systemic concept, although it is rarely 
explicitly characterized as such.  The purpose of this paper is to call attention to the need to 
revitalize CSR's systemic elements and to offer some suggestions about how this might be 
accomplished.  In management, the definition of corporate social responsibility has been the 
topic of significant debate (Aguinis & Glavas 2012; Carroll 1999, 2008; Crane, McWilliams, 
Matten, Moon, & Siegel 2008; Garriga & Mele 2004; Mele 2008).  Although no consensus has 
been reached, it now appears that a definitional truce is taking hold, with an increasing number 
of CSR scholars acknowledging that it is an "essentially contested concept" (Crane, McWilliams, 
et al. 2008: 5) that should be viewed as a gestalt or umbrella term for a number of different 
approaches to the business-society interface (Beal 2014; De Bakker, Groenewegen, & Den Hond 
2005; Lockett, Moon, & Visser 2006; Okoye 2009).  From this perspective, CSR is more of an 
identifying brand or loose association of related research streams than a singular theoretically (or 
empirically) viable construct (Rowley & Berman 2000). 
Although we are comfortable with this ambiguity—and with the notion that CSR is a kind of 
meta-construct—we are concerned that this lack of definitional specificity renders CSR 
susceptible to co-optation or appropriation by different economic stakeholders with an interest in 
reframing CSR in terms of organizational competencies, competitive advantage and other 
business-level constructs (Baden & Harwood 2013; Kurucz, Colbert, & Wheeler 2008; Schreck 
2011; Waddock & Graves 1997).  However broadly the scholarly CSR community may define it, 
if CSR is to remain a distinctive and legitimate approach to the study of the relationship of 
business to society, it must provide a means of dealing with reputational positioning, 
greenwashing, window-dressing, and other self-interested organization-level behaviors that 
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may—or may not—contribute to positive societal outcomes (Aguinis & Glavas 2012; Baden & 
Harwood 2013; Cai, Jo, & Pan 2012; Collier & Esteban 2007; Matejek & Gössling 2014; 
Sigurthorsson 2012).  For example, as Sigurthorsson posits in a recent paper on the Icelandic 
banking crisis, if CSR is unable to distinguish between programs and policies that are little more 
than public relations rhetoric, then it may be time to rethink the term (Sigurthorsson 2012).  
Similarly, Baden and Harwood (2013) suggest that CSR language and terminology may be at 
least partly to blame for CSR's co-optation by economic interests and its subsequent ethical and 
normative timidity. 
The broad idea of connecting individual actions to social outcomes has been embedded in 
the concept of CSR since at least the 1950s (Carroll 2008; Claydon 2011; Moura-Leite & Padgett 
2011).  Despite these roots, systemic issues, such as level of analysis problems, micro-to-macro 
transitions, the emergence of norms, barriers to collective action, and social dilemmas, among 
others, have received relatively little contemporary attention in the CSR literature (Aguinis & 
Glavas 2012; Alexander, Giesen, Munch, & Smelser 1987; Beal 2012; Coleman 1990; Kollock 
1998; Schelling 1978).  The objective of this paper is to reemphasize the inherently systemic 
character of CSR.  In other words, we want CSR to mean something, and we want that 
"something" to be a sense of responsibility to contribute to desired systemic outcomes.  CSR 
should involve more than a simple concern for societal welfare, it should involve confronting the 
complexity inherent in connecting individual-level behavior and systemic outcomes.  CSR, in its 
various forms, should require participants to beyond the perception or veneer of social 
responsibility by verifying that CSR behavior actually contributes to these outcomes.  We join 
with Aguinis and Glavas (2012) and others who have recently called for greater theoretical and 
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multilevel integration and have begun to approach CSR from a more systemic perspective (e.g. 
Boulouta & Pitelis 2014; Fooks, Gilmore, Collin, Holden, & Lee 2013; Sigurthorsson 2012). 
Motivated by these concerns, we propose an approach to CSR that emphasizes the 
challenges of micro-to-macro transition, the need to make systemic objectives explicit, and the 
responsibility of system participants to regulate their behavior in order to contribute to these 
desired objectives.  We refer to this approach as systemic CSR.  After discussing the distinctive 
elements of this approach in greater detail, we make the case that businesses, because they are 
active participants in the social construction of their environment, have a local informational 
advantage that can be leveraged in self-regulatory efforts.  We then revisit a number of the most 
visible research streams (or sub-areas) in the CSR literature and comment on their systemic 
elements.  We then argue that practical application of systemic CSR should be guided by three 
general considerations: 1) a focus on value creation, 2) assessment of collective outcomes, and 3) 
reflective engagement in the micro-to-macro transition process.  We conclude by highlighting a 
number of avenues for future research, including system boundaries, time frame, the nature of 
agent interaction, and incentives. 
SYSTEMIC CSR: DEFINITION & APPLICATION 
Attempts to map the CSR field in management have identified a relatively large number of 
informal sub-areas, distinct streams of scholarly dialogue, and different theoretical approaches 
(for overviews, see Aguinis & Glavas 2012; Carroll 1999, 2008; Crane, McWilliams, et al. 2008; 
De Bakker, et al. 2005; Garriga & Mele 2004; Mele 2008; Windsor 2006).  Our objective is to 
revitalize the systemic character of CSR, and we do so in two ways.  First, we argue for a distinct 
sub-area or stream of scholarly CSR dialogue that emphasizes the micro-to-macro problems 
inherent in CSR research, defines CSR in terms of contribution to desired systemic outcomes, 
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and addresses the challenges associated with locating responsibility for the realization of these 
outcomes at the level of the organization (or individual business).  At the same time, we 
emphasize both the historical roots of this approach and its relevance for other CSR sub-areas 
and research streams.  In this section we begin by emphasizing the unique characteristics of 
systemic CSR, and then comment on its application to the broader CSR literature. 
Defining Systemic CSR 
We define systemic CSR as the moral and practical obligation of market participants to 
consider the effect of their actions on desired systemic outcomes and to regulate their behavior in 
order to contribute to the realization of these outcomes.  Systemic CSR differs from other CSR 
research streams in at least three ways.  First, it is characterized by an explicit focus on the 
micro-to-macro transition involved in linking the behavior of system participants to systemic 
outcomes.  This link is often counter-intuitive, contingent, and complex (Aguinis, Boyd, Pierce, 
& Short 2011; Coleman 1990; Schelling 1978).  From this perspective, the question of how 
market participants can contribute to the realization of desired systemic outcomes is as relevant 
as the moral (or prescriptive) assertion that they have a responsibility to do so.  The question of 
what the "right" behavior is in different contexts can depend on a confusing array of 
contingencies, including the types of goods or resources being exchanged or consumed (Hardin 
1968, 1998; Ostrom 1990), the way in which participants interact with each other and the 
incentives involved (Heckathorn 1996; Kollock 1998; Schelling 1978), and the presence of 
different kinds of market failure, including information asymmetries (Akerlof 1970; Stigler 
1961) and network externalities (Arthur 1989; Katz & Shapiro 1985, 1986). 
The second distinctive feature of systemic CSR is a return to the notion that systemic 
objectives matter.  If what distinguishes CSR activities from traditional business activities is their 
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contribution to the realization of desired systemic outcomes, then it becomes necessary to make 
such outcomes explicit.  Early work in CSR—work that is, in many ways, more systemic in its 
approach than contemporary CSR scholarship—explicitly addresses the question of systemic 
outcomes.  For example, Bowen, whose foundational work "provides a clear and refreshing 
reminder that social responsibility is first and foremost a systemic concept" (Acquier, Gond, & 
Pasquero 2011: 625), includes a chapter in his 1953 book, Social Responsibilities of the 
Businessman, that introduces eleven macroeconomic objectives that anchor his subsequent 
discussion of CSR (1953).  Davis and Blomstrom (1971), in their groundbreaking textbook, 
Business, Society, and Environment, likewise anchor their treatment of CSR in a number of 
different macroeconomic outcomes.  From a systemic perspective, failure to define systemic 
outcomes highlights "the broad problem of the indeterminacy of the scope and content of the 
duties that CSR is supposed to address" (Sigurthorsson 2012).  It is this indeterminacy that 
makes CSR susceptible to co-optation and reframing by different organizational stakeholders—
and it is this indeterminacy that a revitalization of a systemic approach to CSR is intended to 
address. 
Finally, the third distinguishing characteristic of systemic CSR is its emphasis on the 
obligation of participants to regulate their behavior in order to bring it into congruence with 
system-level objectives.  Systemic CSR, therefore, challenges a taken-for-granted feature of 
economic markets—i.e. that participants can focus on individual interests while ignoring the 
macro- or system-level effects of such behavior.  In this context, the distinction between 
independent and interdependent activity by market participants becomes important.  If market 
participants are influenced by the (anticipated) decisions of other participants, this 
interdependence violates a number of the basic assumptions required for economic markets to 
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deliver efficient outcomes.  This interdependence creates social dilemmas, defined as interaction 
(or exchange) contexts in which individual-level rationality can produce collectively irrational 
outcomes (Heckathorn 1996; Kollock 1998; Ormerod 1998; Ostrom 2000).  In other words, 
under the assumption of behavioral interdependence, the pursuit of individual interests by 
participants cannot be trusted—or outsourced—to the invisible hand of the market mechanism 
because doing say may lead to suboptimal, inefficient, and even harmful collective outcomes 
(Beal 2012; Schelling 1978).  In some situations—e.g. in contexts when an assumption of 
behavioral independence can reliably be adopted (Lindblom 2001; Walters 1993)—the pursuit of 
individual self-interest may be the most effective way to contribute to particular outcomes (as 
argued by Friedman and others) (Bator 1957; Friedman 1970).  In other contexts, however, 
particularly in situations characterized by social dilemmas, the most effective way to contribute 
to the realization of certain outcomes may be to engage in behavior that differs significantly from 
accepted profit-maximizing scripts.  In either case, systemic CSR requires participants to 
carefully monitor and regulate their behavior. 
We make two systemic arguments for why system participants should insource 
responsibility for collective outcomes.  First, ethical and legal standards for business do not exist 
as separate and objective benchmarks outside the business context.  These standards are socially 
constructed and negotiated through processes in which businesses actively participate.  In other 
words, legal and ethical standards for business are influenced by managerial choice and should 
not be conceptualized as a “totally external referent on which to base a corporate decision” 
(Ostas, 2001).  As Ostas puts it, CSR expects businesses to “recognize the choices incumbent in 
both legal and market decisions, and to accept responsibility for those choices. This calls upon 
the manager to use his or her creative moral imagination” (2001, p. 297).  Second, Hayek argues 
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that one of the primary virtues of the price mechanism is that it broadcasts enough information to 
enable market participants to effectively utilize local and/or private knowledge in their economic 
decisions (1945, 1948)  In other words, given that important knowledge exists in a decentralized 
and distributed form throughout a network of exchange participants, and that this knowledge 
cannot be centralized in any coherent or useful form, the market mechanism effectively pushes 
enough information out into the network itself, and distributes it in such a manner, that local (or 
private) knowledge  can be effectively utilized.  We repurpose Hayek’s arguments to make the 
same case for the kind of local or private knowledge that is essential to CSR behavior.  To the 
degree that insourcing CSR in the form of voluntary and decentralized self-regulatory efforts is 
able to tap into dispersed knowledge in broad exchange networks, CSR will have an inherent 
advantage over centralized regulatory efforts (Ostrom, 1990, 2000, 2010). 
Systemic CSR in the Broader CSR Context 
Because systemic issues are embedded in almost all CSR approaches, there is a need for a 
renewed focus on CSR's systemic elements.   Table 1 lists a number of CSR subareas or research 
streams with key sources and associated systemic questions.  In some cases, desired systemic 
objectives are explicit.  For example, bottom-of-the-pyramid research attempts to link a 
particular kind of profit-seeking behavior to the alleviation of poverty in less developed 
countries.  Likewise, the literature on corporate citizenship addresses the question of whether or 
not the use of citizenship as a metaphor for the extra-economic responsibilities of businesses is 
likely to improve the administration of citizenship rights.  In other cases, more emphasis is 
placed on organizational-level framing and impact and collective objectives are less explicit. 
Insert Table 1 here 
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We comment below in greater detail on four of these CSR approaches: shareholder value, 
corporate social performance, normative stakeholder theory and corporate citizenship (see Table 
2).  We classify each approach as instrumental, integrative, ethical or political (see Garriga & 
Mele 2004), comment on actor orientation, and provide a brief assessment of the degree to which 
micro-to-macro transitions have been addressed (see Table 2).  Each of these four approaches 
places different demands on market participants with respect to system-level awareness and 
willingness to contribute to desired systemic outcomes.  For example, shareholder value theory 
relies on the logic of the perfect competition market model to absolve market participants from 
the burden of system-level considerations.  From this perspective, such considerations can be 
“outsourced” to the invisible hand of the market, and it is assumed that individual actions will 
aggregate to produce desired collective outcomes (Friedman 1970; Hayek 1945; Smith 1976 
[1776]).  In contrast, the corporate social performance approach suggests paying attention to “the 
broad pattern of social direction in public opinion” (Preston & Post 1981, p. 57) as one way of 
heightening system-level awareness, while stakeholder theory requires an informed sensitivity to 
the process of value creation for multiple stakeholders.  Finally, the corporate citizenship 
approach encourages businesses to adopt the metaphor of citizenship as a template for explicit 
consideration of the link between individual action and the realization of broader objectives of 
the polis (Sison 2011). 
Insert Table 2 here 
Shareholder Value Theory 
From a shareholder value perspective, a business is a legal entity established for the purpose 
of organizing economic activities with the objective of providing its owners (i.e. shareholders) 
with a return on invested capital (Friedman 1970; Jensen 2000). While emphasis on shareholder 
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value may appear incompatible with the notion of social responsibility, understood as other-
regarding behavior unrelated to the maximization of profit, this may not necessarily be the case.  
If it is assumed that the primary purpose of an economic system is to maximize general welfare, 
the question of social responsibility, as it relates to shareholder value, can be reduced to a 
question of means.  Framed as a question, given the larger (societal) objective of economic 
efficiency, what behaviors by system participants will most effectively contribute to the 
realization of this objective? Viewed from this perspective, what appears to be an argument 
against the assumption of social responsibility in favor of a focus on shareholder value can be 
interpreted as a disagreement about how to most effectively contribute to economic efficiency 
(Agle et al. 2008, see Freeman's comments on ending the "Friedman-Freeman" debate). 
Shareholder value is closely aligned with the perfect competition market model (PCMM) or 
what has been referred to elsewhere as American Corporate Capitalism (ACC) (George 2014; 
Kasser, et al. 2007).  Although firm-level implications—and individual-level motivations—of 
the PCMM are often framed in individualistic terms (see Table 1), the PCMM relies on an 
explicit theory of aggregation that links the actions of individual economic actors (individuals 
and firms) to particular collective or macro-level outcomes (Bator 1957; Smith 1976 [1776]; 
Walters 1993).  By carefully theorizing of the micro-to-macro link in a way that associates 
individualistic, utility-maximizing behavior by market participants with optimal collective or 
macro-level outcomes (e.g. productive and allocative efficiency, maximization of social surplus), 
the PCMM can legitimately be included in forms of CSR.   Although its behavioral 
prescriptions—an individualistic, utility-maximizing orientation—may seem out of place in a 
CSR context, if these kinds of behaviors represent the most effective way to deliver desired 
social outcomes, then such behavior is, in virtue of its ultimate results, socially responsible.   
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Paradoxically, therefore, from a shareholder value perspective, it is by resisting “pretty 
words and soft ideas,” and by focusing instead on the hard task of maximizing shareholder value, 
that business leaders contribute most effectively to the social good (Levitt 1958: 41).  
Contemplation of the body of economic theory behind this counter-intuitive assertion leads to the 
realization, in the context of shareholder value, that the micro-to-macro link—the systemic 
connection between individual behavior and macro- or system-level outcomes—has been 
explicitly and thoroughly addressed in a more rigorous way than in other CSR approaches (see 
Table 1).  This is not a defense of the PCMM (or ACC), merely a recognition of the need to more 
explicitly address the micro-to-macro transition in other CSR contexts.  It is also ironic (but 
perhaps, understandable) that the shareholder value approach—an approach that requires 
minimal systemic awareness on behalf of individual economic actors—has gone further than 
many CSR approaches in theorizing the micro-to-macro linkages that connect its individual 
behavioral prescriptions and its stated macro-level objectives or outcomes. 
Corporate Social Performance 
A corporate social performance (CSP) perspective adopts as a normative starting point the 
notion that with economic power come social responsibilities that may be distinct from the 
pursuit of profit (Carroll 1979; Swanson 1995; Wartick & Cochran 1985; Wood 1991, 2010).  
These responsibilities should manifest themselves as responsiveness to social demands, even if 
these demands are situated beyond the contractual or legal obligations of the firm.  Society, in 
other words, has extended business a license to operate, and if societal expectations are not met, 
this license may be amended in significant ways or rescinded altogether.  Consequently, Wood 
(1991) proposes a comprehensive CSP model in which business response to societal demands is 
Systemic CSR 
 
12 
 
structured into principles, processes and outcomes, with each of these components subdivided 
into additional categories and constituent parts. 
The CSP perspective introduces the notion that societal expectations may be communicated 
in other ways than through shifts in aggregate supply and demand, and that market participants 
should therefore observe not only “the literal text of law and regulation, but also the broad 
pattern of social direction reflected in public opinion, emerging issues, formal legal 
requirements, and enforcement or implementation practices” (Preston & Post 1981, p. 57).  
Responding effectively to shifts in societal expectations requires attention to social and political 
environments and purposeful adaptation to changing social contexts.  Although this requires a 
degree of social awareness beyond that demanded by shareholder value theory and the PCMM, 
CSP is primarily reactive in nature, and remains tethered to the shareholder value perspective, 
given that organizational performance is generally defined in ways that privilege shareholders 
and improving this performance remains the primary motivational force behind CSP initiatives.  
In addition, there has been relatively little effort to explicitly link CSP behavior to improved 
macro-level outcomes. The danger in ignoring the micro-to-macro link, as we articulate more 
fully below, is that this relationship may be counter-intuitive (as the shareholder value approach 
demonstrates) and there is no guarantee that more "socially aware" actions by individual 
economic actors will lead to more socially responsible macro- or system-level outcomes. 
Normative Stakeholder Theory 
Initially proposed in the early 1980s as a new conceptual framework for the strategic 
management of the modern corporation (Freeman 1984), stakeholder theory reframes CSR in 
terms of multiple and complex relations between business and the various categories of social 
agents with whom it interacts.  Stakeholders are defined as “those groups and individuals that 
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can affect, or are affected by, the accomplishment of organizational purpose” (Freeman 1984, p. 
25).  From this perspective, the firm is viewed as a nexus of overlapping and competing interests 
that are managed in such a way that value is created for all stakeholders (Freeman & Liedtka 
1991; Freeman & Velamuri 2006).  Corporations are “connected sets of stakeholders, all of 
whom are ‘in it together’” (Freeman & Liedtka 1991, p. 97). 
Importantly, from a normative stakeholder theory perspective, the immediacy of profits is 
not the overriding factor in prioritizing competing interests (Argandoña 1998; Donaldson & 
Preston 1995; Freeman, et al. 2010).  In contrast to the PCMM (or ACC), normative stakeholder 
theory represents a dynamic, interactive, and collaborative approach to value creation that 
encourages a long-term view of ongoing relationships and business sustainability (Freeman, et al. 
2010; Laplume, et al. 2008).  Although normative stakeholder theory explicitly encourages what 
we describe as a "cooperative" actor orientation (see Table 1), we have two reservations about its 
capacity to address larger systemic issues.  Because stakeholder networks are generally smaller 
and less complex than the larger social systems in which organizations are embedded, normative 
stakeholder theory may not be an ideal template for moving beyond the boundaries of the firm to 
address systemic issue at the industry, national and/or global level of analysis.  If this theory is to 
be effective in larger systemic contexts, additional work may need to be done to flesh out the 
mechanisms through which cooperative interaction at the organizational level—guided by what 
Freeman refers to as a "new narrative of capitalism" (Freeman, et al. 2010: 269)—will produce 
desired macro- or system-level outcomes. 
Stakeholder theory's "normative core" (Freeman 1994: 413) have been explored from a 
number of different philosophical perspectives (Argandoña 1998; Burton & Dunn 1996; 
Donaldson & Dunfee 1994; Phillips 1997), and Freeman himself (e.g. Freeman 2000; Freeman, 
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et al. 2010) has been explicit about stakeholder theory's aspirations to reshape the underlying 
narratives of capitalist political economy.  While the attractiveness and fungible nature of 
stakeholder theory's core principles of action—particularly in contrast to the PCMM's (or ACCs) 
rational, competitive, and narrowly-self-interested homo economicus—have almost certainly 
contributed to its widespread dissemination across different business disciplines, theories that 
address system behavior must be accompanied by attention to the micro-to-macro transition and, 
in our view, this aspect of stakeholder theory is still more emergent (see, for example, Bridoux & 
Stoelhorst 2014; Freeman 2010; Rowley 1997; Verbeke & Tung 2013).  Because stakeholder 
theory operates at different levels of analysis, it is important to recognize that there is a need to 
connect the behavior of individual stakeholders to the characteristics and features of the 
organization of which they are a part and, simultaneously, to connect the actions of individual 
organizations to the characteristics and features of larger economic systems, such as industries, 
sectors, and the global marketplace. 
Corporate Citizenship 
The term "corporate citizenship" was popularized and promoted in practitioner circles by 
managers, consultants and the business press, before it took root in the academic literature 
(Altman & Vidaver-Cohen 2000; Matten, et al. 2003).  As initially conceptualized by a number 
of scholars, corporate citizenship described a particular strategic organizational posture that was 
associated with local philanthropic efforts, targeted community investment, and other activities 
designed to contribute to the health and stability of an organization's economic, social and 
political environment (e.g. Waddock 2000).  These activities were often framed as "enlightened" 
self interest and justified in financial terms (Crane, Matten, et al. 2008a, 2008b; Matten & Crane 
2005).  Corporation citizenship has also been employed as a synonym for the broader concept of 
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CSR (Crane, Matten, et al. 2008b).  Matten and colleagues have described these two approaches 
as the "limited view" and the "equivalent view" of corporate citizenship, respectively, and 
asserted that neither approach adequately explores the concept of organizational citizenship 
(Crane, Matten, et al. 2008b; Matten & Crane 2005; Matten, et al. 2003).  Others have suggested 
that this conceptualization of corporate citizenship, with its simplistic emphasis on "giving back" 
and "tit-for-tat" reciprocity (Wood & Logsdon 2002: 65), represents a convenient reframing of 
CSR that moves away from broad moral and ethics-based concerns, and is therefore less 
threatening to popular notions of capitalist political economy.  In this vein, what some scholars 
characterize as "enlightened" self-interest others describe as conscience laundering (Harvey 
2014). 
Recently, a third approach to corporate citizenship has emerged that explicitly focuses on 
the idea that the metaphor of citizenship can serve as a basis for a political conceptualization of 
the firm (Logsdon & Wood 2002; Windsor 2001; Wood & Logsdon 2001, 2002).  Referred to by 
Matten and colleagues as an "extended view of corporate citizenship," this approach asserts that 
the modern corporation can play an important role in safeguarding individual citizenship rights 
(Matten & Crane 2005) and, as a political actor, in shaping larger "rule-finding discourses" and 
"rule-setting processes" (Pies, et al. 2014: 232).  This perspective has opened up a spirited 
dialogue regarding the nature of citizenship and the ontological status of the corporation (e.g. 
Ablander & Curbach 2014; French 1979; Sison 2011; Wood & Logsdon 2002).  It has also 
provoked enthusiastic resistance from those who view a political role for corporations as 
fundamentally incompatible with the self-interested, profit-maximizing DNA of business 
institutions (Barley 2007; Néron & Norman 2008; van Oosterhout 2005, 2008, 2010). 
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Despite these challenges, significant progress has been made in extending the concept of 
corporate citizenship into the global arena where transnational and multinational corporations are 
actively engaged in shaping normative and regulatory governance structures (Palazzo & Scherer 
2008; Scherer & Palazzo 2007, 2011; Scherer, et al. 2006; Scherer, et al. 2014).  In many ways, 
this body of work by Scherer and colleagues exhibits a systemic focus that both parallels and 
complements our efforts to reintroduce systemic thinking into the broader CSR dialogue.  Put 
simply, in this extended conceptualization, corporate citizenship is employed as a metaphor that 
enables businesses to transcend their role as a broker for a finite set of specific stakeholders by 
framing their behavior in broader systemic terms (e.g. as a corporate citizen in an emerging 
global society).  Corporate citizenship, therefore, invokes a cooperative actor orientation (see 
Table 1).  Although the specific mechanisms—the micro-to-macro link through which 
cooperative citizenship behavior by organizations contributes to desired macro- or system-level 
outcomes—is still emergent, significant progress has been made.  Pies, Beckmann and Hielscher 
(2014), for example, address the challenges associated with value creation and the pursuit of the 
Aristotelian concept of self-perfection (applied to business organizations) in institutional 
contexts characterized by social dilemmas, stable but inefficient collective outcomes (i.e. 
collective irrationality), and perverse incentives. 
Regardless of the specific approach, CSR can be characterized as an effort to understand 
and/or manage systemic outcomes by analyzing and/or changing the behavior of system 
participants.  Viewed this way, CSR's progression from description to prescription makes 
intuitive sense, given that efforts to produce desired systemic outcomes (e.g. alleviation of 
poverty, stewardship of the environment, economic prosperity) often find traction in efforts to 
change the behavior of individual participants that populate these systems.  Absent behavioral 
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prescriptions, however, we now turn to the practical question of how system participants can 
regulate their behavior in order to contribute to the realization of desired systemic outcomes. 
SYSTEMIC CSR: GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR INDIVIDUAL ACTION 
We observe that businesses routinely demonstrate their ability to think in systemic terms in 
strategic contexts that require it.  For example, textbooks on corporate strategy often discuss such 
topics as network externalities, winner-take-all markets, coordination problems, cooperative 
strategies, game theory, the economics of information, and other situations that require systemic 
awareness.  If businesses can address systemic issues in these contexts, then they can also apply 
systemic logic in furtherance of collective (or system-level) objectives.  Because the social 
processes through which individual actions are aggregated to produce collective outcomes are 
often complex, we offer three general principles that market participants can use as conceptual 
guideposts: 1) A focus on value creation, 2) Assessment of collective outcomes, and 3) 
Reflective engagement in the aggregation process. 
Focus on Value Creation 
Systemic CSR emphasizes value creation as the primary purpose of business activity.  As 
Wheeler and colleagues state, the “creation of value is the central motive force of market 
economies, and by extension the primary purpose of private enterprise” (Wheeler, Colbert, & 
Freeman 2003, p. 2).  The importance of an explicit emphasis on value creation becomes 
apparent when it is recognized that prices may not accurately reflect value.  Where this occurs, 
the profit derived by subtracting costs from revenue (as traditionally calculated) is unreliable 
indicator of the value created.  Value creation has been theorized as a function of the utility a 
customer places on a product (‘utility to consumer’), of the ‘product price’, and of the ‘cost of 
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production’ to the firm (Besanko, Dranove, Shanley, & Schaefer 2010; Hill & Jones 2010, pp. 
77-81).   
Profit maximization will lead to value creation when the following conditions are met: 1) 
The cost of production represents the total product costs (i.e. no costs are unaccounted for), 2) 
The value to the consumer represents the total value of the product (i.e. no benefits are 
unaccounted for), and 3) There is no further advantage to be derived by the individual economic 
agent from engaging in cooperative behavior with other economic agents. Instances in which 
market participants fail to accurately incorporate all the costs of production into their decision 
calculus are plentiful, e.g. when costs associated with pollution and other negative externalities 
are ignored.  On the other hand, cases in which the benefits of a particular product or service can 
only be appropriated in part by consumers may result in situations in which individual-level 
profit fails to accurately represent the value creation process (Santos 2012). 
There are also contexts in which benefits may be derived from cooperative behavior among 
individual economic agents.  A classic example is the “tragedy of the commons” (Hardin, 1968), 
in which individuals make individual-level utility maximizing decisions regarding usage of 
shared resources and such decisions result in the collective mismanagement and/or depletion of 
those resources (Hardin 1968; Kollock 1998).  “Standards wars” represent another example of 
this kind of situation (Shapiro & Varian 1999).  Pies, Meckmann, and Hielscher  argue that when 
firms are forced to confront situations involving perverse incentives that are likely to produce 
suboptimal collective outcomes, they should focus on "perfection of the institutional order" by 
actively participating in the "relevant meta game of governance" and contributing to "reforming 
the rules of the game" (2010: 245).  Research on multi-stakeholder initiatives and other types of 
“soft-law” regulation (Gilbert, Rasche, & Waddock 2011; Mena & Palazzo 2012; Norman 2011) 
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further illustrates that systemic CSR may involve not only individual behavior, but also 
participation in cooperative or collective attempts to shape the structure of the larger institutional 
context in which this behavior takes place. 
Assessment of Collective Outcomes 
Familiarity with economic markets, and the fact that markets can (and often do) coordinate 
individual actions to produce beneficial collective outcomes, has engendered a significant 
amount of trust in market-based systems (Kuttner 1997).  In reality, however, markets are prone 
to suboptimal outcomes in certain predictable circumstances (Schelling 1978; Stiglitz 2000) and 
outcomes derived from individual-level responses to aggregate supply or demand signals, or 
those resulting from either the presence or absence of collective action, can often be improved 
upon.  For instance, the absence of a park in a particular subdivision or neighborhood should not 
be viewed as an indication that there is no “demand” for a park.  The costs of collective action, 
and problems inherent in supplying public goods, such as individual-level incentives to engage in 
free-riding behavior, may prevent the building of a park—an action which would create 
significant value for the individuals in the neighborhood (e.g. availability of recreational 
opportunities, quality of life, higher property value, etc.).  At a system level, boom-and-bust 
waves in different markets and industries, price spikes, investment manias, speculative bubbles, 
bank runs, free rider scares, negative externalities and other “rational irrationalities” are 
situations in which collective outcomes could be improved significantly if individual participants 
allowed their behavior to be shaped by a desire to create collective value rather than a narrow 
focus on individual utility maximization (Caplan 2001).  Systemic CSR, therefore, has the 
potential to create significant social value by encouraging efficient self-regulation of negative 
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externalities, enlightened and visionary contribution to positive externalities, and cooperation as 
a means of resolving social dilemmas (see, for example, Lauesen 2013). 
Reflective Engagement in the Aggregation Process 
In practice, from a systemic CSR perspective, business should incorporate aggregation logic 
into their operational and/or strategic decisions.  This calls for an appreciation of the challenges 
and complexities of the micro-to-macro transition and the aggregation process (see Coleman 
1990, particularly Chapter 1).  Two primary aggregation logics in management thinking are the 
PCMM, and the game-theoretical or rational choice approach to social dilemmas.  The PCMM, 
as developed by theorists and enacted by practitioners and other market participants, relies on a 
well developed theory of aggregation.  It identifies systemic objectives (i.e. wealth creation), 
prescribes individual participant behavior (i.e. utility maximization), and then illustrates how the 
actions of individual participants, in aggregate, lead to desirable system-level outcomes.  It is 
only because the contours of the PCMM are familiar that it seems unremarkable that self-
interested individual behavior is often the most effective way to contribute to desirable 
collective. 
In contrast to the PCMM, the aggregation process involved in social dilemma situations is 
more complex and less well understood.  Social dilemmas are defined as interaction (or 
exchange) situations in which, due to actor interdependence, individual-level rationality can 
produce collectively irrational outcomes.  Examples of common types of social dilemmas 
include the prisoner’s dilemma, the assurance game, the chicken game, the social fence dilemma, 
the tragedy of the commons.  Ostrom (1990, 2000, 2010), in particular, has pioneered work on 
the resolution of these types of dilemmas. Solutions generally involve either the expansion of the 
definition of self-interest to include systemic considerations (as systemic CSR suggests), or 
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cooperative approaches in which participants monitor individual behavior, provide selective 
incentives, set up sanctioning systems, or establish an external authority (Kollock 1998).  Both 
the PCMM and theories of collective action recommend general solutions to broad classes of 
interaction and exchange situations.  Systemic CSR suggests a contingent approach to 
aggregation.  Businesses should reflectively engage in the aggregation process and should find 
local solutions to idiosyncratic challenges. 
CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
We began this paper by defining systemic CSR as the practical and moral obligation of 
market participants to consider the effect of their actions on desired systemic outcomes and to 
regulate their behavior so that it contributes to those outcomes.  We argued that systemic CSR is 
unique in its explicit focus on the micro-to-macro transition (i.e. the process of aggregation), 
systemic objectives, and the need to actively insource responsibility for contribution to the 
realization of those objectives.  From a systemic perspective, we briefly commented on 
shareholder value theory, corporate social performance, stakeholder theory, and corporate 
citizenship, with a view to emphasizing systemic elements of CSR in the current literature.  We 
then argued that the application of systemic CSR should be guided by three general principles: 1) 
a focus on value creation, 2) ongoing assessment of collective outcomes, and 3) reflective 
engagement in the aggregation process.  Increasingly sophisticated frameworks and models are 
now available to firms for assessing contributions to value creation beyond traditional 
profitability metrics (see, for example, Beal 2014; Daza 2009; Dincer & Dincer 2012; Fifka & 
Drabble 2012; Marimon, Alonso-Almeida, Rodríguez, & Cortez Alejandro 2012).   Firms should 
be reluctant to rely on price signals as reliable indicators of efficiency and should be actively 
engaged in the aggregation process. 
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Although we have defined the concept and outlined its main practical principles, 
considerable work remains to be done.  Recent criticisms of CSR have highlighted problems 
related to incentives and enforcement mechanisms (Karnani 2010, 2011a, 2011b; Vogel 2005).  
We argue that social expectations and norms can serve as powerful constraints on individual 
behavior and can, in many cases, bring individual incentives in line with system objectives.  Just 
as part of the genius of the market mechanism can be traced to the ways in which decentralized 
knowledge can be leveraged by individual market participants, part of what makes systemic CSR 
compelling is its potential for leveraging this same type of embedded knowledge for a broader 
purpose through voluntary self-regulatory efforts.  Because systemic CSR relies on group 
expectations and norms to promote systemically responsible behavior by individual participants, 
it provides a practical resolution to the ongoing debate about whether or not companies have 
social responsibilities (see, for example, Karnani, 2011b; Rivoli & Waddock, 2011).  Although it 
has been argued that conforming to societal norms and expectations is not CSR, we assert just 
the opposite, particularly in situations in which individual businesses enjoy an informational 
advantage.  Further, Karnani (2010) insists that laws and external regulation are more likely to be 
effective in forcing firms to engage in actions directed towards the public good.  In reply, we 
suggest that systemic CSR is itself a form of regulation, albeit an internalized one, and has the 
potential to be even more effective, under certain circumstances, than more traditional (i.e. 
centralized) regulatory efforts.  Recent work on self-regulation, multi-stakeholder initiatives, and 
different governance modes illustrate the potential value of a more systemic approach to CSR 
(Gilbert, et al. 2011; Mena & Palazzo 2012; Norman 2011; Rasche & Gilbert 2012; Yue, Luo, & 
Ingram 2013). 
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There is a need for empirical research on contexts in which non-market aggregation logics 
yield collective outcomes that are superior to those produced by individual profit maximization.  
Although strategy texts incorporate, in a limited way, discussions of some of these different 
contexts (e.g. standards wars, network externalities, technological lock-in, information 
economics, etc.), the lack of empirical analysis of these topics in the CSR literature is cause for 
concern, given the extensive empirical work from other disciplines that could be used to ground 
such efforts.  In situations in which it is recognized that market activity is likely to lead to 
suboptimal outcomes, participants should engage, either individually or collectively, in behavior 
that will improve outcomes even though doing so may require participants to deviate from 
traditional utility-maximizing scripts.  In some cases, for example, the level of demand for a 
particular product cannot be assumed to be optimal, even though it may be stable over time 
and/or appear to be the product of market processes (Beal, 2012). 
The case of Lojack, a radio-transmitter device used to locate stolen vehicles, illustrates this 
problem (Ayres & Levitt 1998).  Lojack is a security device for automobiles.  If a vehicle with 
Lojack is stolen, the device can be activated and used to quickly determine the vehicle’s location.  
Installation of a Lojack system costs approximately $600.  Because the device is hidden in the 
vehicle, it provides very little deterrent benefit to the individual consumer.  Although the device 
provides only limited direct benefit, it provides significant benefit to the larger community.  
Because of the speed and accuracy with which stolen “Lojacked” vehicles can be tracked, “chop-
shops” are more likely to be discovered and shut down, and car thieves are significantly more 
likely to be apprehended and jailed.  This often leads to a significant reduction in overall car 
thefts.  One study estimates that, in certain communities, every three Lojack installations prevent 
one annual car theft (Ayres & Levitt 1998).  This same study estimates that individual customers 
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obtain less than 10% of the social value of the product.  In this case, and in other situations in 
which significant benefits from particular products and services accrue to third-parties not 
involved in the transaction (i.e. there are positive externalities), individual-level profits under- 
represent the value created.  In this case, profit-maximizing decisions will lead to an 
underproduction of goods with significant value at system level. 
How firms work either individually or collectively, to address these types of situations 
should be of particular interest to CSR scholars.  Ostrom’s work in behavioral economics, for 
example, could be adapted to study collective action among publicly-traded firms.  Similarly, 
findings from social psychology could be used to guide firms in resolving social dilemmas.  For 
example, Bridoux, Coeurderoy and Durand (2011) explicitly draw on research on social 
dilemmas in social psychology and behavioral economics to generate a number of interesting 
propositions related to firm incentive systems.  Research on contextual factors such as system 
boundaries, time frame and the nature of agent interaction, is also important.  From a systemic 
perspective, a firm needs to be able to provide a specific answer to each of the following 
questions: (1) What are the scope and limits of the system envisaged as a target for the value 
creation process? (2) What time frame is appropriate for the calculation (or estimation) of 
system-level utility? and (3) What types of agent interaction (e.g. independent or interdependent) 
characterize the particular circumstances in which the value creation process is carried out? 
  
Systemic CSR 
 
25 
 
REFERENCES  
Ablander, M., & Curbach, J. 2014. 'The corporation as citoyen? Towards a new understanding of 
corporate citizenship'. Journal of Business Ethics, 120(4), 541-554. 
Acquier, A., Gond, J.-P., & Pasquero, J. 2011. 'Rediscovering Howard R. Bowen’s legacy: The 
unachieved agenda and continuing relevance of Social Responsibilities of the 
Businessman'. Business & Society, 50(4), 607-646. 
Adler, N. J. 2008. 'Global business as an agent of world benefit: New international business 
perspectives leading positive change'. In G. Palazzo & A. G. Scherer (Eds.), Handbook of 
Research on Global Corporate Citizenship (pp. 374-404). Northampton: Edward Elgar 
Publishing. 
Agle, B. R., Donaldson, T., Freeman, R. E., Jensen, M. C., Mitchell, R. K., & Wood, D. J. 2008. 
'Dialogue: Toward superior stakeholder theory'. Business Ethics Quarterly, 18(2), 153-
190. 
Agle, B. R., Mitchell, R. K., & Sonnenfeld, J. A. 1999. 'Who matters to CEOs? An investigation 
of stakeholder attributes and salience, corpate performance, and CEO values'. Academy of 
Management Journal, 42(5), 507-525. 
Aguinis, H., Boyd, B. K., Pierce, C. A., & Short, J. C. 2011. 'Walking new avenues in 
management research methods and theories: Briding micro and macro domains'. Journal 
of Management, 37(2), 395-403. 
Aguinis, H., & Glavas, A. 2012. 'What we know and don't know about corporate social 
responsibility: A review and research agenda'. Journal of Management, 38(4), 932-968. 
Akerlof, G. A. 1970. 'The market for "lemons": Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism'. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84(3), 488-500. 
Alexander, J. C., Giesen, B., Munch, R., & Smelser, N. J. (Eds.). (1987). The micro-macro link. 
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 
Altman, B. W., & Vidaver-Cohen, D. 2000. 'A framework for understanding corporate 
citizenship: Introduction to the special edition of Business and Society Review 
"Corporate Citizenship for the New Millennium"'. Business & Society Review, 105(1), 1. 
Argandoña, A. 1998. 'The stakeholder theory and the common good'. Journal of Business Ethics, 
17(9/10), 1093-1102. 
Arthur, W. B. 1989. 'Competing technologies, increasing returns, and lock-in by historical 
events'. The Economic Journal, 99(394), 116-131. 
Ayres, I., & Levitt, S. D. 1998. 'Measuring positive externalities from unobservable victim 
precaution: An empirical analysis of Lojack'. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113(1), 
43-77. 
Baden, D., & Harwood, I. 2013. 'Terminology matters: A critical exploration of corporate social 
responsibility terms'. Journal of Business Ethics, 116(3), 615-627. 
Barley, S. R. 2007. 'Corporations, democracy, and the public good'. Journal of Management 
Inquiry, 16(3), 201-215. 
Bator, F. M. 1957. 'The simple analytics of welfare maximization'. American Economic Review, 
47(1), 22-59. 
Beal, B. D. 2012. 'Competitive markets, collective action, and the Big Box Retailer problem'. 
Journal of Philosophical Economics, 6(1), 2-29. 
Beal, B. D. 2014. Corporate social responsibility: Definition, core issues, and recent 
developments. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications Inc. 
Systemic CSR 
 
26 
 
Berchicci, L., Dowell, G., & King, A. A. 2012. 'Environmental capabilities and corporate 
strategy: Exploring acquisitions among us manufacturing firms'. Strategic Management 
Journal, 33(9), 1053-1071. 
Berry, T., & Junkus, J. 2013. 'Socially responsible investing: An investor perspective'. Journal of 
Business Ethics, 112(4), 707-720. 
Besanko, D., Dranove, D., Shanley, M., & Schaefer, S. 2010. Economics of strategy (5th ed.). 
Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
Boulouta, I., & Pitelis, C. 2014. 'Who needs CSR? The impact of corporate social responsibility 
on national competitiveness'. Journal of Business Ethics, 119(3), 349-364. 
Bowen, H. R. 1953. Social responsibilities of the businessman. New York: Harper & Row. 
Bridoux, F., Coeurderoy, R., & Durand, R. 2011. 'Heterogeneous motives and the collective 
creation of value'. Academy of Management Review, 36(4), 711-730. 
Bridoux, F., & Stoelhorst, J. W. 2014. 'Microfoundations for stakeholder theory: Managing 
stakeholders with heterogeneous motives'. Strategic Management Journal, 35(1), 107-
125. 
Burton, B. K., & Dunn, C. P. 1996. 'Feminist ethics as moral grounding for stakeholder theory'. 
Business Ethics Quarterly, 6(2), 133-147. 
Cai, Y., Jo, H., & Pan, C. 2012. 'Doing well while doing bad? CSR in controversial industry 
sectors'. Journal of Business Ethics, 108(4), 467-480. 
Capelle-Blancard, G., & Monjon, S. 2012. 'Trends in the literature on socially responsible 
investment: Looking for the keys under the lamppost'. Business Ethics: A European 
Review, 21(3), 239-250. 
Caplan, B. 2001. 'Rational ignorance versus rational irrationality'. Kyklos, 54(1). 
Carroll, A. B. 1979. 'A three-dimensional conceptual model of corporate performance'. Academy 
of Management Review, 4(4), 497-505. 
Carroll, A. B. 1999. 'Corporate social responsibility: Evolution of a definitional construct'. 
Business and Society, 38(3), 268-296. 
Carroll, A. B. 2008. 'A history of corporate social responsibility: Concepts and practices'. In A. 
Crane, A. McWilliams, D. Matten, J. Moon & D. Siegel (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of 
corporate social responsibility (pp. 19-46). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Claydon, J. 2011. 'A new direction for CSR: The shortcomings of previous CSR models and the 
rationale for a new model'. Social Responsibility Journal, 7(3), 405-420. 
Coleman, J. S. 1990. Foundations of social theory. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press. 
Collier, J., & Esteban, R. 2007. 'Corporate social responsibility and employee commitment'. 
Business Ethics: A European Review, 16(1), 19-33. 
Crane, A., Matten, D., & Moon, J. 2008a. Corporations and citizenship. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Crane, A., Matten, D., & Moon, J. 2008b. 'The emergence of corporate citizenship: Historical 
development and alternative perspectives'. In G. Palazzo & A. G. Scherer (Eds.), 
Handbook of Research on Global Corporate Citizenship (pp. 25-49). Northampton: 
Edward Elgar Publishing. 
Crane, A., McWilliams, A., Matten, D., Moon, J., & Siegel, D. 2008. 'The corporate social 
responsibility agenda'. In A. Crane, A. McWilliams, D. Matten, J. Moon & D. Siegel 
(Eds.), The Oxford handbook of corporate social responsibility (pp. 3-15). Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Systemic CSR 
 
27 
 
Davis, K., & Blomstrom, R. L. 1971. Business, society, and environment: Social power and 
social response (2nd ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company. 
Daza, J. R. P. 2009. 'A valuation model for corporate responsibility'. Social Responsibility 
Journal, 5(3), 284-299. 
De Bakker, F. G. A., Groenewegen, P., & Den Hond, F. 2005. 'A bibliometric analysis of 30 
years of research and theory on corporate social responsibility and corporate social 
performance'. Business & Society, 44(3), 283-317. 
Dincer, B., & Dincer, C. 2012. 'Measuring brand social responsibility: A new scale'. Social 
Responsibility Journal, 8(4), 484-494. 
Donaldson, T., & Dunfee, T. W. 1994. 'Toward a unified conception of business ethics: 
Integrative social contracts theory'. Academy of Management Review, 19(2), 252-284. 
Donaldson, T., & Preston, L. E. 1995. 'The stakeholder theory of the corporation: Concepts, 
evidence, and implications'. Academy of Management Review, 20(1), 65-91. 
Dunfee, T. W. 2008. 'Stakeholder theory: Managing corporate social responsibility in a multiple 
actor context'. In A. Crane, A. McWilliams, D. Matten, J. Moon & D. Siegel (Eds.), The 
Oxford handbook of corporate social responsibility (pp. 346-362). Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Fassin, Y., & Van Rosem, A. 2009. 'Corporate governance in the debate on CSR and ethics: 
Sensemaking of social issues in management by authorities and CEOs'. Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, 17(5), 573-593. 
Fifka, M. S., & Drabble, M. 2012. 'Focus and standardization of sustainability reporting – A 
comparative study of the United Kingdom and Finland'. Business Strategy and the 
Environment, 21(7), 455-474. 
Fombrun, C. J., & Gardberg, N. A. 2000. 'Opportunity platforms and safety nets: Corporate 
citizenship and reputational risk'. Business & Society Review (00453609), 105(1), 85. 
Fooks, G., Gilmore, A., Collin, J., Holden, C., & Lee, K. 2013. 'The limits of corporate social 
responsibility: Techniques of neutralization, stakeholder management and political CSR'. 
Journal of Business Ethics, 112(2), 283-299. 
Fowler, S., & Hope, C. 2007. 'A critical review of sustainable business indices and their impact'. 
Journal of Business Ethics, 76(3), 243-252. 
Freeman, R. E. 1984. Strategic management: A stakeholder approach. Boston: Pitman 
Publishing Inc. 
Freeman, R. E. 1994. 'The politics of stakeholder theory: Some future directions'. Business 
Ethics Quarterly, 4(4), 409-421. 
Freeman, R. E. 2000. 'Business ethics at the millennium'. Business Ethics Quarterly, 10(1), 169-
180. 
Freeman, R. E. 2010. 'Managing for stakeholders: Trade-offs or value creation'. Journal of 
Business Ethics, 96, 7-9. 
Freeman, R. E., Harrison, J., Parmar, B., & De Colle, S. 2010. Stakeholder theory: The state of 
the art. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Freeman, R. E., & Liedtka, J. 1991. 'Corporate social responsibility: A critical approach'. 
Business Horizons, 34(4), 92-98. 
Freeman, R. E., & Velamuri, S. R. 2006. 'A new approach to CSR: Company stakeholder 
responsibility'. In A. Kakabadse & M. Morsing (Eds.), Corporate social responsibility: 
Reconciling aspiration with application (pp. 9-23). New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
French, P. A. 1979. 'The corporation as a moral person'. American Philosophical Quarterly, 
Systemic CSR 
 
28 
 
16(3), 207-215. 
Friedman, M. (1970). The social responsibility of business is to increase its profits, New York 
Times Magazine, pp. 1-4.  
Garriga, E., & Mele, D. 2004. 'Corporate social responsibility theories: Mapping the territory'. 
Journal of Business Ethics, 53, 51-71. 
George, J. M. 2014. 'Compassion and capitalism: Implications for organizational studies'. 
Journal of Management, 40(1), 5-15. 
Gilbert, D. U., Rasche, A., & Waddock, S. 2011. 'Accountability in a global economy: The 
emergence of international accountability standards'. Business Ethics Quarterly, 21(1), 
23-44. 
Godfrey, P. C. 2005. 'The relationship between corporate philanthropy and shareholder wealth: 
A risk management perspective'. Academy of Management Review, 30(4), 777-798. 
Godfrey, P. C., Hatch, N. W., & Hansen, J. M. 2010. 'Toward a general theory of CSRs: The 
roles of beneficience, profitability, insurance, and industry heterogeneity'. Business & 
Society, 49(2), 316-344. 
Griffin, J. J., & Mahon, J. F. 1997. 'The corporate social performance and corporate financial 
performance debate: Twenty-five years of incomparable research.'. Business & Society, 
36(1), 5-31. 
Hardin, G. 1968. 'The tragedy of the commons'. Science, 162(3859), 1243-1248. 
Hardin, G. 1998. 'Extensions of "The tragedy of the commons"'. Science, 280(5364), 682-683. 
Hart, S. L. 1995. 'A natural-resource-based view of the firm'. Academy of Management Review, 
20(4), 986-1014. 
Hart, S. L., & Dowell, G. 2011. 'A natural-resource-based view of the firm: Fifteen years after'. 
Journal of Management, 37, 1464-1479. 
Harvey, D. 2014. Seventeen contradictions and the end of capitalism. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Hayek, F. A. 1945. 'The use of knowledge in society'. The American Economic Review, 35(4), 
519-530. 
Hayek, F. A. 1948. Individualism and economic order. Chicago: Chicago University Press. 
Heckathorn, D. D. 1996. 'The dynamics and dilemmas of collective action'. American 
Sociological Review, 61, 250-277. 
Hill, C. W. L., & Jones, G. R. 2010. Strategic management: An integrated approach (9th ed.). 
Mason, OH: South-Western Cengage Learning. 
Ho, F., Wang, H.-M., & Vitell, S. 2012. 'A global analysis of corporate social performance: The 
effects of cultural and geographic environments'. 107, 423-433. 
Jensen, M. C. 2000. 'Value maximization, stakeholder theory, and the corporate objective 
function'. In M. Beer & N. Nohria (Eds.), Breaking the code of change (pp. 37-58). 
Boston: Harvard Business School Press. 
Jo, H., & Na, H. 2012. 'Does CSR reduce firm risk? Evidence from constroversial industry 
sectors'. Journal of Business Ethics, 110(4), 441-456. 
Karnani, A. 2010. 'The case against corporate social responsibility'. Wall Street Journal (Eastern 
Edition), 256(45), R1-R4. 
Karnani, A. 2011a. 'CSR Stuck in a Logical Trap'. California Management Review, 53(2), 105-
111. 
Karnani, A. 2011b. '"Doing well by doing good": The grand illusion'. California Management 
Review, 53(2), 69-86. 
Systemic CSR 
 
29 
 
Kasser, T., Cohn, S., Kanner, A. D., & Ryan, M. R. 2007. 'Some costs of American corporate 
capitalism: A psychological exploration of value and goal conflicts'. Psychological 
Inquiry, 18(1), 1-22. 
Katz, M. L., & Shapiro, C. 1985. 'Network externalities, competition and compatibility'. 
American Economic Review, 75(3), 424-440. 
Katz, M. L., & Shapiro, C. 1986. 'Technology adoption in the presence of network externalities'. 
Journal of Political Economy, 94(4), 822-841. 
Kolk, A., Rivera-Santos, M., & Rufín, C. 2014. 'Reviewing a decade of research on the 
“Base/Bottom of the Pyramid” (BOP) concept'. Business & Society, 53(3), 338-377. 
Kollock, P. 1998. 'Social dilemmas: The anatomy of cooperation'. Annual Review of Sociology, 
24, 183-214. 
Kurucz, E. C., Colbert, B. A., & Wheeler, D. 2008. 'The business case for corporate social 
responsibility'. In A. Crane, A. McWilliams, D. Matten, J. Moon & D. Siegel (Eds.), The 
Oxford handbook of corporate social responsibility (pp. 83-112). Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Kuttner, R. 1997. Everything for sale: The virtues and limits of markets. New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf. 
Laplume, A. O., Sonpar, K., & Litz, R. A. 2008. 'Stakeholder theory: Reviewing a theory that 
moves us'. Journal of Management, 34(6), 1152-1189. 
Lauesen, L. M. 2013. 'CSR in the aftermathy of the financial crisis'. Social Responsibility 
Journal, 9(4), 641-663. 
Levitt, T. 1958. 'The dangers of social responsibility'. Harvard Business Review, 36(5), 41-50. 
Lindblom, C. E. 2001. The market system: What it is, how it works, and what to make of it. New 
Haven: Yale University Press. 
Lockett, A., Moon, J., & Visser, W. 2006. 'Corporate social responsibility in management 
research: Focus, nature, salience and sources of influence'. Journal of Management 
Studies, 43(1), 115-136. 
Logsdon, J. M., & Wood, D. J. 2002. 'Business citizenship: From domestic to global level of 
analysis'. Business Ethics Quarterly, 12(2), 155-187. 
Marimon, F., Alonso-Almeida, M. d. M., Rodríguez, M. d. P., & Cortez Alejandro, K. A. 2012. 
'The worldwide diffusion of the global reporting initiative: What is the point?'. Journal of 
Cleaner Production, 33(2012), 132-144. 
Matejek, S., & Gössling, T. 2014. 'Beyond Legitimacy: A Case Study in BP's 'Green Lashing''. 
Journal of Business Ethics, 120, 571-584. 
Matten, D., & Crane, A. 2005. 'Corporate citizenship: Toward an extended theoretical 
conceptualization'. Academy of management Journal, 30(1), 166-179. 
Matten, D., Crane, A., & Chapple, W. 2003. 'Behind the Mask: Revealing the True Face of 
Corporate Citizenship'. Journal of Business Ethics, 45(1/2), 109-120. 
Mele, D. 2008. 'Corporate social responsibility theories'. In A. Crane, A. McWilliams, D. 
Matten, J. Moon & D. Siegel (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of corporate social 
responsibility (pp. 47-82). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Mena, S., & Palazzo, G. 2012. 'Input and output legitimacy of multi-stakeholder initiatives'. 
Business Ethics Quarterly, 22(3), 527-556. 
Mitchell, R. K., Agle, B. R., & Wood, D. J. 1997. 'Towards a theory of stakeholder identification 
and salience: Defining the principle of who and what really counts'. Academy of 
Management Review, 22(4), 853-886. 
Systemic CSR 
 
30 
 
Moura-Leite, R. C., & Padgett, R. C. 2011. 'Historical background of corporate social 
responsiblity'. Social Responsibility Journal, 7(4), 528-539. 
Néron, P.-Y., & Norman, W. 2008. 'Citizenship, Inc.: Do we really want businesses to be good 
corporate citizens?'. Business Ethics Quarterly, 18(1), 1-26. 
Norman, W. 2011. 'Business ethics as self-regulation: Why principles that ground regulations 
should be used to ground beyond-compliance norms as well'. Journal of Business Ethics, 
102, 43-57. 
Okoye, A. 2009. 'Theorising corporate social responsibility as an essentially contested concept: 
Is a definition necessary?'. Journal of Business Ethics, 89(4), 613-627. 
Orlitzky, M., Schmidt, F. L., & Rynes, S. L. 2003. 'Corporate social and financial performance: 
A meta-analysis'. Organization Studies, 24(3), 403-441. 
Ormerod, P. 1998. Butterfly economics: A new general theory of social and economic behavior. 
New York: Pantheon Books. 
Ostas, D. T. 2001. 'Deconstructing corporate social responsibility: Insights from legal and 
economic theory'. American Business Law Journal, 38, 261-299. 
Ostrom, E. 1990. Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Ostrom, E. 2000. 'Collective action and the evolution of social norms'. Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 14(3), 137-158. 
Ostrom, E. 2010. 'Analyzing collective action'. Agricultural Economics, 41(6), 155-166. 
Palazzo, G., & Scherer, A. G. 2008. 'The future of global corporate citizenship: Toward a new 
theory of the firm as a political actor'. In G. Palazzo & A. G. Scherer (Eds.), Handbook of 
Research on Global Corporate Citizenship (pp. 577-590). Northampton: Edward Elgar 
Publishing. 
Phillips, R. A. 1997. 'Stakeholder theory and the principle of fairness'. Business  Ethics 
Quarterly, 7(1), 51-66. 
Pies, I., Beckmann, M., & Hielscher, S. 2010. 'Value creation, management competencies, and 
global corporate citizenship: An ordonomic approach to business ethics in the age of 
globalization'. Journal of Business Ethics, 94(2), 265-278. 
Pies, I., Beckmann, M., & Hielscher, S. 2014. 'The political role of the business firm: An 
ordonomic concept of corporate citizenship developed in comparison with the 
Aristotelian idea of individual citizenship'. Business & Society, 53(2), 226-259. 
Porter, M. E., & Kramer, M. R. 2006. 'Strategy & society: The link between competitive 
advantage and corporate social responsibility'. Harvard Business Review, 84(12), 78-92. 
Porter, M. E., & Kramer, M. R. 2011. 'Creating shared value'. Harvard Business Review, 89(1/2), 
62-77. 
Prahalad, C. K. 2005. The fortune at the bottom of the pyramid: Eradicating poverty through 
profits. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Wharton School Publishing. 
Prahalad, C. K., & Hammond, A. 2002. 'Serving the world's poor, profitably'. Harvard Business 
Review, 80(9), 48-57. 
Preston, L. E., & Post, J. E. 1981. 'Private management and public policy'. California 
Management Review, 23(3), 56-62. 
Rasche, A., & Gilbert, D. U. 2012. 'Institutionalizing global governance: The role of the United 
Nations Global Compact'. Business Ethics: A European Review, 21(1), 100-114. 
Rivoli, P., & Waddock, S. 2011. '"First they ignore you...": The time-context dynamic and 
corporate responsibility'. California Management Review, 53(2), 87-104. 
Systemic CSR 
 
31 
 
Rowley, T. J. 1997. 'Moving beyond dyadic ties: A network theory of stakeholder influences'. 
Academy of Management Review, 22(4), 887-910. 
Rowley, T. J., & Berman, S. L. 2000. 'A brand new brand of corporate social performance'. 
Business & Society, 39(4), 397-418. 
Santos, F. 2012. 'A positive theory of social entrepreneurship'. Journal of Business Ethics, 
111(3), 335-351. 
Schelling, T. C. 1978. Micromotives and macrobehavior. New York: W. W. Norton & 
Company. 
Scherer, A. G., & Palazzo, G. 2007. 'Toward a political conception of corporate responsibility: 
Business and society seen from a Habermasian perspective'. Academy of Management 
Review, 32(4), 1096-1120. 
Scherer, A. G., & Palazzo, G. 2011. 'The new political role of business in a globalized world: A 
review of the new perspective on CSR and its implications for the firm, governance, and 
democracy'. Journal of Management Studies, 48(4), 899-931. 
Scherer, A. G., Palazzo, G., & Baumann, D. 2006. 'Global rules and private actors: Toward a 
new role of the transnational corporation in global governance'. Business Ethics 
Quarterly, 16(4), 505-532. 
Scherer, A. G., Palazzo, G., & Matten, D. 2014. 'The business firm as a poltical actor: A new 
theory of the firm for a globalized world'. Business & Society, 53(2), 143-156. 
Schreck, P. 2011. 'Reviewing the business case for corporate social responsibility: New evidence 
and analysis'. Journal of Business Ethics, 103(2), 167-188. 
Shapiro, C., & Varian, H. R. 1999. 'The art of standards wars'. California Management Review, 
41(2), 8-32. 
Sigurthorsson, D. 2012. 'The Icelandic banking crisis: A reason to rethink CSR?'. Journal of 
Business Ethics, 111, 147-156. 
Sison, A. 2011. 'Aristotelian Citizenship and Corporate Citizenship: Who is a Citizen of the 
Corporate Polis?'. Journal of Business Ethics, 100(1), 3-9. 
Smith, A. 1976 [1776]. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (Vol. I). 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Stigler, G. J. 1961. 'The economics of information'. Journal of Political Economy, 69(3), 213-
225. 
Stiglitz, J. E. 2000. Economics of the public sector (3rd ed.). New York: W. W. Norton & 
Company. 
Sundaram, A. K., & Inkpen, A. C. 2004. 'The corporate objective revisited'. Organization 
Science, 15(3), 350-363. 
Swanson, D. L. 1995. 'Addressing a theoretical problem by reorienting the corporate social 
performance model'. Academy of Management Review, 20, 43-64. 
Ullmann, A. A. 1985. 'Data in search of a theory: A critical examination of the relationships 
among social performance, social disclosure, and economic performance of U.S. firms'. 
Academy of Management Review, 10(3), 540-557. 
van Oosterhout, J. 2005. 'Corporate citizenship: An idea whose time has not yet come'. Academy 
of Management Review, 30(4), 677-681. 
van Oosterhout, J. 2008. 'Transcending the confines of economic and political organization?'. 
Business Ethics Quarterly, 18(1), 35-42. 
van Oosterhout, J. 2010. 'The role of corporations in shaping the global rules of the game: In 
search of new foundations'. Business Ethics Quarterly, 20(2), 253-264. 
Systemic CSR 
 
32 
 
Verbeke, A., & Tung, V. 2013. 'The furture of stakeholder management theory: A temporal 
perspective'. Journal of Business Ethics, 112(3), 529-543. 
Vogel, D. 1986. 'The study of social issues in management: A critical appraisal'. California 
Management Review, 28(2), 142-151. 
Vogel, D. 2005. The market for virtue: The potential and limits of corporate social responsiblity. 
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. 
Waddock, S. 2000. 'The multiple bottom lines of corporate citizenship: Social investing, 
reputation, and responsiblity audits'. Business & Society Review, 105(3), 323. 
Waddock, S. A., & Graves, S. B. 1997. 'The corporate social performance-financial performance 
link'. Strategic Management Journal, 18(4), 303-319. 
Walters, S. J. K. 1993. Enterprise, government, and the public. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Wartick, S. 1994. 'Toward a substantive definition of the corporate issue construct: A review and 
synthesis of the literature'. Business and Society, 33(3), 292-311. 
Wartick, S. L., & Cochran, P. L. 1985. 'The evolution of the corporate social performance 
model'. Academy of Management Review, 10(4), 758-769. 
Wheeler, D., Colbert, B., & Freeman, R. E. 2003. 'Focusing on value: Reconciling corporate 
social responsibility, sustainability and a stakeholder approach in a network world'. 
Journal of General Management, 28(3), 1-28. 
Windsor, D. 2001. 'Corporate citizenship: Evolution and interpretation'. In J. Andriof & M. 
McIntosh (Eds.), Perspectives on corporate citizenship (pp. 39-52). Sheffield, UK: 
Greenleaf Publishing. 
Windsor, D. 2006. 'Corporate social responsibility: Three key approaches'. Journal of 
Management Studies, 43(1), 93-114. 
Wood, D. J. 1991. 'Corporate social performance revisited'. Academy of Management Review, 
16(4), 691-718. 
Wood, D. J. 2010. 'Measuring corporate social performance: A review'. International Journal of 
Management Reviews, 12(1), 50-84. 
Wood, D. J., & Logsdon, J. M. 2001. 'Theorising business citizenship'. In J. Andriof & M. 
McIntosh (Eds.), Perspectives on corporate citizenship (pp. 83-103). Sheffield, UK: 
Greenleaf Publishing. 
Wood, D. J., & Logsdon, J. M. 2002. 'Business citizenship: From individuals to organizations'. 
Ruffin Series of the Society for Business Ethics, 3, 59-94. 
Yue, L. Q., Luo, J., & Ingram, P. 2013. 'The failure of private regulation: Elite control and 
market crises in the Manhattan banking industry'. Administrative Science Quarterly, 
58(1), 37-68. 
 
 
  
Table 1: Subareas of CSR Research with Key Systemic Question(s) 
 
  
Systemic CSR 
 
34 
 
 
Table 2: Systemic Elements of Four CSR Approaches 
 
 
 
